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Abstract
Increased efforts in neuroscience try to understand mental disorders as brain disorders.
In the present study we investigate how common a neuroreductionist inclination is in the
popular mind. Identically graphed, simulated data of mind-brain correlations were shown in
three contexts with presumably different presumptions about causality. 738 highly-educated
laymen rated plausibility of causality attribution from brain to mind and from mind to brain
for correlations between brain structural properties and mental phenomena in the context of
commonly perceived brain-lesion induced behavior (aphasia), behavior-induced training effects
(piano playing), and a newly described mental disorder (Body Integrity Dysphoria). The find-
ings reveal the expected context-dependent modulation, but also a general tendency to more
readily attribute causal inference from brain to mind than vice versa. We argue that this
tendency has important consequences, especially in the context of Body Integrity Dysphoria,
a condition where little is known about underlying causal mechanisms.
Significance Statement
Unjustified causal inferences from correlation are a common practice, even in highly edu-
cated individuals. In neuroimaging data which typically depicture the correlation between a
brain measure and a behaviorally measured mental phenomenon such causal inference might
be influenced by a general tendency towards neuroreductionsm. Indeed, in an online study,
we show that while the strength and direction of causal inference differ depending on the con-
text, people overall judged a unidirectional influence from brain to mind more likely than vice
versa. We outline the far-reaching consequences of this bias in the face of the conceptualization
of mental disorders, exemplified here by the case of Body Integrity Dysphoria, considered a
mental disorder for the first time in ICD-11.
The relation between mind and brain has a long and convoluted history, both in the philosophy of
mind and in neuroscience. Those who think they have overcome mind-brain dualism are often lost
in positions betwixt and between, and their reasoning continues to operate dualistically, if only in
covert and unacknowledged ways [1]. An overt solution of dualistic thinking is arguably offered by
neuroreductionism. More than a century ago, Griesinger famously stated that all mental diseases
are brain diseases [2] , a view that has recently been echoed authoritatively [3]. Although the claim
that neural structure would cause mental disorder is not made explicit, it certainly lurks behind
such an assumption. Many scholars have criticized such accounts by stressing the importance of
integrating somoatopsychic and socio-psychosomatic factors in a fashion which is neither brainless
nor mindless [4, 5].
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Such debates are not only of academic interest, but the conceptualization and the assumed cause
of mental disorders determine their social acceptance, classification and basic medical treatment
strategies. Classification systems like the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) or the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) are constantly updated and reflect
current societal perspective on mental health as much as they influence it.
Here, we focus on a condition newly introduced as a mental disorder by ICD-11 (ICD-11).
Labeled Body Integrity Dysphoria (BID), it designates the pathological suffering from having a
nondisabled body. Its most frequent variant is specific and consists in the desire for amputation
of a healthy limb. The term Xenomelia was proposed by those considering it a focal disease of
the brain [6]. Others conceptualize BID as a pure sickness of the mind, i.e. an “Internet-based
madness” [7].
In order to investigate how prominent neuroreductionism is in educated, but non-expert quar-
ters, and how much it is influenced by context, we collected plausibility ratings of suggested mind-
brain and brain-mind causalities for identically depicted typical correlative neuroimaging data. We
contrasted three different contexts with presumably different degrees of general knowledge about
hypothesized brain-behavior relations. Like our simulated data, neuroimaging studies generally
describe correlations between a neural measure (e.g. density of gray matter, blood oxygenation
etc.) and a specific behavior or a subjective state. Such correlations do not allow any causal
inference [8]. Therefore, causal judgments of correlative data elucidate implicit presuppositions,
either from brain to mind or vice versa. These presuppositions might depend on folk psycholog-
ical intuitions such as the assumed temporal relation in the specific contexts. Especially if little
additional information is provided, as in the case of a newly described disorder like BID, such
causal inference plausibility judgments may inform us about participants’ beliefs about brain mind
relation in mental disorders.
In the present study, we depicted the same simulated correlation in different contexts, which
were induced by the labels of the axes. Aphasia after stroke, professional piano playing and
xenomelia, were chosen as three reprehensive contexts in order to evoke different assumptions in
lay people regarding the temporal aspects of the event and thus bias causality judgments: brain
damage leading to change in behavior (context stroke / receptive aphasia), intense musical training
leading to brain alterations (context professional piano playing), and a new mental disorder, where
no clear information about the temporal course is currently available (context xenomelia). Given
the clear time course of events in the first context - the cerebral infarction precedes symptoms of
receptive aphasia – we expected the additional information, contained in folk-neuropsychological
knowledge [9], to bias participants’ plausibility judgments in favor of a causality from brain to
mind (compared to that in the opposite direction). With respect to musical training, in line with
both the common sense that the behavior (early and extensive piano practice) precedes potential
brain alterations and scientific findings showing training-induced alterations in gray matter density
[10], we expected higher mind to brain plausibility ratings. We compare these two contexts to a
correlation between symptoms of xenomelia and structural properties of a circumscribed cortical
surface area, loosely inspired by the first publication on neurostructural data in xenomelia [11]. We
assumed no additional information justifying unidirectional judgment with respect to this largely
unknown disorder, but expected higher plausibility ratings from brain to mind [12].
We recruited three independent samples of participants with third level education only, one
for each context (n=253 for xenomelia, n=258 for stroke / receptive aphasia, n= 251 for piano
players per sample) via the online recruiting service Prolific. The surveys were created using the
software PsyToolkit [13, 14]. In each context, participants saw the same scatter plot of a specific
behavioral or subjective measure and its neural correlate, as well as a brain plot with color-coded
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) (generated with BrainNet Viewer [15] and a corresponding TPJ
mask (TPJ mask). The depicted data (see Figure 1) thus showed scientifically plausible, but not
actually collected data. The TPJ was chosen as a plausible representative neural correlate for
all three contexts (see SOM for more details). The only difference between the contexts was the
labeling of behavioral and neural measures to the x or y axis. Furthermore, to avoid confounding
effects due to the general accord that predictors are typically associated with the x-axes, the
two axes were randomized within each group (see SOM for more details). Below the plot we
provided a short description about each context. Plausibility ratings were assessed on a visual
analog scale (VAS), and we refer to brain primacy, as the plausibility of the vector of causality
pointing from brain to mind and to mind primacy, as the plausibility of the vector pointing from
mind to brain. Figure 1 illustrates the survey data and main questions for all three contexts.
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Prior to data collection we had pre-registered our hypothesis and statistical analysis procedure
(https://osf.io/35jpw).
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Figure 1: Survey plots. The same scatter and brain plots are displayed for all contexts. (A)
shows the labeling and survey questions for the context professional piano players. (B) for the
context xenomelia and (C) for the context stroke / receptive aphasia
Brain and mind primacy were compared by separate Wilcoxon signed rank tests for each con-
text. Inter-context differences of mind and brain primacy were analyzed using a rank-transformed
one-way ANOVA. Participants who indicated to suffer from xenomelia (n=4 ), had experienced
receptive aphasia (n=1) as well as professional piano players (n=4) and participants who did not
provide any causality judgements were excluded from the analysis. The final samples comprised
244 (159 females; age 22.6 +/- 3.8 ) participants for the context of xenomelia, 249 (131 females;
age 23.0 +/- 4.7) participants for the context of receptive aphasia and 245 (139 females; age 23.4
+/- 4.9) participants for the context of piano players.
In accordance with our prediction, we found a significant brain primacy effect in the context
stroke / receptive aphasia (p < 0.0001, effect size r = 0.79) and a significant mind primacy effect
in the context professional piano playing (p < 0.0001, effect size r = - 0.36). Furthermore, as
expected, the causal interpretation from brain to mind was significantly more prominent than
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from mind to brain in the context xenomelia (p < 0.0001, effect size r = 0.58). Even though we
argued that the third context lacks additional information that would justify unidirectional causal
judgment, our data indicate a significant brain primacy in the context xenomelia (see Fig 2). The
inter-context differences of brain and mind primacy were also reflected in the significant results of
the ANOVA on ranks (inter-context brain primacy p < 0.0001, inter-context mind primacy p <
0.0001; see Fig 2).
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Figure 2: Survey results. The box plots show the comparison of neural and behavioral primacy
in all three contexts. The lines show the comparison of neural and behavioral primacy between
the contexts (ANOVA p-value of neural and behavioral primacy respectively << 0.0001)
The results suggest that the sample of highly educated laypeople here investigated indeed adapt
their (unjustified) causality judgements to the particular context they are confronted with. This
indicates that our measure of primacy effects well captures the presuppositions of the participants.
In the case of Body Integrity Dysphoria, a still largely unknown clinical condition, the data reveal
a clear preference for a brain-to-mind directed causality, indicating that participants assumed the
phenomenal and behavioral properties to be a consequence, rather than a cause of brain alterations.
A similar finding was previously reported by Brugger et al. (2018) [12]; however, the present
investigations highlight that implicit assumptions about a correlation that importantly bias the
misattribution to an underlying cause significantly depend on the context.
The present work shows that educated laymen do infer from correlation to causality in a way
that suggests neuroreductionism, popular among experts of past and contemporary neuropsychia-
try [2,3]. While speculative, we believe that this interpretation of the data reflects a general trend
in contemporary society. It may thus be appropriate to think ahead of this trend and muse where
it could lead to. What does it ultimately mean if mental disorders were conceived as imperatively
caused by neural alterations? Let us imagine a health system in which the decision whether some-
one is treated as mentally disordered is purely based on the currently available brain diagnostics.
Would people who actually suffer mentally but who do not show any of the currently identified
neurological biomarkers of a mental illness be denied access to therapeutical interventions in such a
system? Likewise, would people who do not experience mental suffering but who show alterations
in their brains be treated as mentally disordered? Would the fact that people see the primary cause
of mental disorders in neural alterations lead to a preference for neuropharmacological as opposed
to psychological or sociocultural treatments? Such questions shed light on the importance of how
we define what is “mentally ill”. Mental disorders have been identified by phenomenological re-
ports of mental suffering in the first place [2]. Only afterwards, neural mechanisms which correlate
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with mental discomfort may be identified [2], and might be potentially developed into biomarkers.
The neuroreductionist stance tries to replace the definition of mental disorders by precisely those
neural correlates that could not have been identified without phenomenological reports of people’s
suffering. Additionally, cultural variations play an important role in defining abnormality, thus,
sociocultural factors are another variable beyond the current scope of neurological biomarkers that
are of paramount importance in order to understand and define mental disorders [5].
With respect to BID, the current neuroreductionist stance might hinder a full understanding
of mental disorders as it fails to take psychosocial and phenomenological components into account.
A proper social neuroscience approach seems to be more suitable in order to understand the
mechanisms associated with symptoms of BID. Measurable neural correlates of the body in the
brain, perceptions of bodily features and sexual identity, as well as culture-bound norms of body
appearance and modification should be integrated into a “social neuroscience view of xenomelia”
[16]. Such integration would welcome the label “body integrity dysphoria” once xenomelia will
finally turn into an officially acknowledged mental disorder. After all, it emphasizes an individual’s
suffering, free of presuppositions about any primacy of brain or mind. This emphasis is precisely
what psychiatry’s role is about.
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